

# Malware Analysis Series (MAS): Article 1

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## 1. Introduction

Welcome to the **MAS (Malware Analysis Series)**. Being very honest, in the last four years it was a quite difficult stopping my research job for writing an article as well as would have impossible writing a series of articles, but I think it's feasible now and let's try it. Just to give an example, last time I wrote a superficial article was in 2017 and, certainly, I didn't even remember until a colleague talked about it recently.

The goal is to produce a series of articles on malware analysis and explain since simple malware binaries up to most complex ones, covering a large list of topics such as **unpacking, API resolving, C2 extraction, C2 emulation** and, of course, **reverse engineering** in addition to some **dynamic analysis** and, maybe, use **few de-obfuscation techniques**. When it's necessary, I'll cover other topics such as **COM (Component Object Model), cryptography, IDC/IDA Python** and everything it necessary to help readers to have a better comprehension of analysis.

Furthermore, I will also write short articles covering topics such as malicious documents (on this time I've already release one: <https://exploitreversing.com/2021/11/02/malicious-document-analysis-example-1/>), programming, de-obfuscation, operating system internals and so on. Nonetheless, the main focus will be **MAS (Malware Analysis Series)**.

As malware analysis produces extensive articles, so I'll break them up in parts 1, 2, and so on, when it will be necessary.

**Every article will be published on my new blog** (using a different font) and, at beginning of each post, **there will be a PDF version of that article.**

During this series of articles, I'm going to use several tools and try to point where you can get them to make things simpler for you.

I am not going to propose only hard samples because, in my humble opinion, this kind of approach wouldn't help anyone (mainly professionals that aim to learn to something) and, at end, it would be only a waste of time (and an useless show-off). Therefore, we'll analyze different samples, each one with a distinguished level of difficulty, and discuss some lines of code. As I mentioned previously, the strategy is to break up an article in different parts if it's necessary to avoid turning the reading so exhausting.

## 2. Lab Setup

Explaining about the lab setup, I usually analyze all samples using one or more of the following systems:

- **Windows 7, Windows 8.1 or Windows 10:** If you need a Windows 10 virtual machine, Microsoft continue offering one with expiration time on this website: <https://developer.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/downloads/virtual-machines/>
- **REMinux (best distribution for reverse engineering):** <https://docs.reminux.org/install-distro/get-virtual-appliance>
- **Ubuntu 20.04.x:** <https://ubuntu.com/download/desktop>

I'll try to avoid using any non-sense techniques and focus on well-known tools. Unfortunately, few of them are not free (*like IDA Pro, which is my favorite one, by far and, in my opinion, the best reversing tool around the world since ever*), but Hex-Rays offers the IDA Free and an affordable paid version named **IDA Home**:

- **IDA Free:** <https://hex-rays.com/blog/announcing-version-7-6-for-ida-freeware/>
- **IDA Home:** <https://hex-rays.com/ida-pro/#main-differences-between-ida-editions>

No doubts, you can use **Ghidra** to disassemble, decompile and debug any code just in case you're more comfortable with it: <https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/ghidra/releases>

You'll need a good debugger and certainly the best one is **x64dbg/x32dbg**, which you can download from the following website:

- **x64dbg:** <https://x64dbg.com/#start>

Additionally, there're tons of **x64dbg plugins** that could be installed to extend x64dbg/x32dbg functionality and are quite recommended during dynamic analysis (mainly to avoid anti-debugging techniques used by malware), so few of them that you could like to install are shown below:

- **ScyllaHide:** it's an advanced anti-debug library that hooks several functions to hide the debugging activity from malware: <https://github.com/x64dbg/ScyllaHide/releases>
- **Labelless:** it's a quite recommended plugin that provides two key-features for reversers:
  - Label, function name, global variable and comment synchronization between x64dbg and IDA Pro.
  - Dynamic dumping of regions from memory for a debugged process, which will be useful, for example, for dumping the binary after its **task API resolving and/or string decoding**.
  - **Labelless plugin** can be downloaded from: <https://github.com/a1ext/labelless/releases>
- **DbgChild:** it provides an automatic detection of child processes created by the debugged process and automatically attaches a new instance of x64dbg to if the the main process forks a new process, so saving your time in many opportunities. **DbgChild** is available from: <https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/DbgChild>

Other useful plugins exist, but let's wait for the appropriate moment to talk about them. On time: many available plugins don't have been regularly kept by their authors and maintainers, so they could not work anytime. Be careful!

All remaining tools will be shown during our analysis and many future articles.

Last, but not least, this article (and all the following ones) certainly will have mistakes that will be fixed and I'll release new PDF versions reflecting all fixes.

### 3. Malware analysis goals

No doubts, It's an interesting point: *what are we looking for while analyzing a binary?*

The question is relevant because there're many possible objectives and aspects to be regarded while analyzing a malware. Nonetheless, during a real-world investigation, there are other important areas as malware analysis and, of course, we should consider them in all moments of our analysis:

- a. **Memory Analysis:** it's an extremely powerful technique, which has proved its unlimited value in the last 10 years and used as a first-approach method during investigations to understand the malware infection events, its consequences, side effects and makes possible to acquire tons of evidences that might be hard to collect from disk or any other source.
- b. **Network Analysis:** it is a quite useful resource (*pcap files*, for example) to understand and detect non-authorized communication (C2 – command and control channel) through traffic analysis and makes artifact gathering (for example, binary files, malicious documents and Cobalt Strike beacons).
- c. **Filesystem/Disk Analysis:** the last frontier of any investigation, where we can analyze and detect side effects of a adversary invasion, breaches, frauds, leaks and, of course, malware infections.

Once again, all of them are very important and must be used in all real world investigation. However, let's return to the key point: why should you learn about reverse engineering and, in special, malware analysis? Simple: through malware analysis you have the opportunity to learn from the source of the evil about intentions and objectives of the the adversary and not only its effects. In other words, you can learn techniques, tricks, evasion strategies and, if you're lucky, you'll can collect important artifacts to make the correct attribution (most of the time, it's a hard task) and, who knows, help to arrest the bad guys.

Therefore, before starting any reversing task, we should remember that there're many questions that we should to consider and ask to ourselves:

- Is the binary **packed**? If it's, so malware is using a well-known packer or a custom one?
- What's the **networking communication** technique/API set being used by malware? From available techniques such as **Winsock2**, **Wininet**, **COM (Component Object Model)** or something in a lower level such as **WSK (Winsock Kernel)** or even custom implemented technique, which is being used?
- Is there any **code injection** or **hooking technique being used**? Which one?
- What are the **anti-forensic techniques** used? Is there any **anti-debugging** technique? **Anti-disassembly**? **Anti-VM/Sandbox**?
- Is there any **API/DLL encoding**?
- Are **strings encrypted**?
- What **synchronization primitives** are being used by the malware? Sometimes they hide important anti-debugging techniques.

- What are **cryptography algorithms** being used by the malware?
- What **persistence methods** are being used by the threat: *Registry, services, tasks or kernel drivers*?
- Is there any **shellcode** being injected into a operating system process?
- Is there any **file system mini-filter driver** being installed by malware?
- If there's a **kernel drivers** being installed, is there any **callback** (a kind of modern hook) or **timer** being installed?

In this first article, we'll focus on only **two short objectives**:

- unpacking the malware**
- extracting and decrypting its C2's configuration data**

We're reviewing some well-known techniques for unpacking malware threats as well as different methods to extract C2's configuration data. Furthermore, I am going to provide a minimum background for some basic topics to help readers to be able to continue their own research about the mentioned topics.

## 4. Gathering initial information

The first sample has the following hash:

(SHA256) **8ff43b6ddf6243bd5ee073f9987920fa223809f589d151d7e438fd8cc08ce292**

We're able to collect so much information from many endpoints such as **Malware Bazaar**, as shown in the figure below:

```
remnux@remnux:~/malware/mas$ malwoverview.py -b 1 -B 8ff43b6ddf6243bd5ee073f9987920fa223809f589d151d7e438fd8cc08ce292 -o 0
```

```
-----
MALWARE BAZAAR REPORT
-----
sha256_hash: 8ff43b6ddf6243bd5ee073f9987920fa223809f589d151d7e438fd8cc08ce292
sha1_hash: f8fb1264a292aecb6c2bf5c5d4f3e199e3a822ad
md5_hash: 4198ac1dc34de77ab8ceac3c9a25480e
first_seen: 2021-10-19 14:58:22
last_seen: 2021-10-19 15:01:32
file_name: gelfor.dap.dll
file_size: 538112 bytes
file_type: dll
mime_type: application/x-dosexec
country: US
imphash: 81bbf124b97b7484333ed4ffba3d7e94
tlsh: T1D2B47D313580D032D02B743EDE64D1F8579A7C26DE686D4B73C82F6FAA2A5C1CE2571A
reporter: James_inthe_box
delivery: other
tags: dll Hancitor
Cape: https://www.capesandbox.com/analysis/198600/
UnpacMe: https://www.unpac.me/results/dbe78747-733f-42cb-a267-a363ea6cf26b/

Triage: https://tria.ge/reports/211019-scqzxsgngr/
Triage sigs:
Hancitor
suricata: ET MALWARE Tordal/Hancitor/Chanitor Checkin
Blocklisted process makes network request
Looks up external IP address via web service
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
```

[Figure 1]

According to the **Figure 1**, we have some important information:

- The target malware seems to be from **Hancitor** family.
- It uses **EnumerateProcesses( )** function, so it could be interesting to understand whether any special reason for that (code injection, for example);
- **WriteProcessMemory( )** is triggered as usually we have seen in **unpacking procedures** and **code injection**, so no news is a good news here.

Extending our data acquisition, we can check the sample on **Triage** for collecting further information:

```
remnux@remnux:~/malware/mas$ malwoverview.py -x 1 -X 8ff43b6ddf6243bd5ee073f9987920fa223809f589d151d7e438fd8cc08ce292 -o 0
```

#### ----- TRIAGE OVERVIEW REPORT

```
id:          211027-q45laaehd2
status:      reported
kind:        file
filename:    8ff43b6ddf6243bd5ee073f9987920fa223809f589d151d7e438fd8cc08ce292
submitted:   2021-10-27T13:49:52Z
completed:   2021-10-27T13:52:43Z
```

```
-----
id:          211019-scqzxsgghr
status:      reported
kind:        file
filename:    gelfor.dap.dll
submitted:   2021-10-19T14:59:05Z
completed:   2021-10-19T15:01:43Z
```

[Figure 2]

There're other tasks id related to this sample, but let's to focus on the first one only. Details about the first task id can be shown by executing the following command (the output was truncated):

```
remnux@remnux:~/malware/mas$ malwoverview.py -x 2 -X 211027-q45laaehd2 -o 0
```

#### ----- TRIAGE SEARCH REPORT

```
score:       10
extracted:
  botnet:     1910_nsw
  c2:         http://newnucapi.com/8/forum.php
              http://gintlyba.ru/8/forum.php
              http://stralonz.ru/8/forum.php
  family:     hancitor
  rule:       Hancitor
  dumped:     memory/1648-57-0x0000000074940000-0x0000000074948000-memory.dmp
  resource:   behavioral1/memory/1648-57-0x0000000074940000-0x0000000074948000-memory.dmp
  tasks:      behavioral1 behavioral2
```

[Figure 3]

Of course, we could obtain additional information about the sample, but it's enough for now because we already have possible C2 (URLs).

Our next step is to find out whether this sample is packed (as most of the malware threats) or not. Furthermore, if it's packed, so we will learn how to unpack it using a debugger like x64dbg.

Nonetheless, let's review few concepts about unpacking malware on Windows systems.

## 5. Unpacking Concepts Review

Every single time I've heard someone talking about unpacking it seems impressions convert to the same conclusion: it might be not so easy. Of course, as we mentioned previously, unpacking a sample is likely the first step before possible string decryption and API/DLL resolving, for example, but we need to start from somewhere and with a goal.

There's a long list of reasons and aspects associated to motivations about packing a malicious code:

- It **makes the malicious code "hidden" from AV**. Of course, it isn't so hidden, but it's a soft evasion technique that make analyst's life a bit harder and, eventually, cause some problems to defenses.
- Packed sample **doesn't reveal the actual goals** of the actual malware.
- It could be **difficult unpacking it dynamically** due many **anti-analysis techniques (anti-debugger and anti-vm tricks)** to be circumvented.
- Malware usually packs valuable code in **several layers** using customized routines.
- Eventually, the whole malware or only the unpacking code might be **polymorphic**.

There are a lot of old well-known packers which we have procedures to unpack the code generated hidden by them, but most of malware authors have been used **customized packers** to turn code undetectable under security defenses monitoring. Additionally, there are some **special packers (as known as protector)** such as **Themida, Arxan, VMProtect, Agile .NET** and many others that usually virtualize their instructions and implement all kind of **anti-forensic and obfuscation techniques**, where few of characteristics are presented below:

- They have been used on **64-bit binaries**.
- **The IAT (Import Address Table) might have been removed** or, at maximum, there could be only one imported function.
- As usual, most **strings are encrypted**.
- **Memory integrity is checked and protected**, so it isn't possible to dump a clean executable from memory because original instructions are not completely decoded there.
- **Instructions are virtualized** and, surprisingly, translated to **RISC instructions**.
- These **virtualized instructions are encrypted** on memory.
- The **obfuscation is stack-based**, so it quite difficult to handle virtualized code using static approach.
- **Most of virtualized code is polymorphic**, so there are many virtual instructions referring to the same original instruction.
- There're thousand lines of **fake "push" instructions** and, of course, many of them contains **dead and useless code**.
- These protectors implement **code reordering using unconditional jumps**.
- All these modern packers use **code flattening**, many **anti-debugging** and **anti-vm techniques**.
- **Not all x64 instructions are virtualized**, so you will find a binary code containing a mix of virtualized and not virtualized (native) instructions.
- Most of time, **prologues and epilogues of functions are not virtualized**.
- Original **code section could be "splitted" and/or scattered around the program**, so instructions and data would be mixed.
- **Instructions referring to imported function might be zeroed or even replaced by NOP**, so in this case these **"references" will be restored dynamically**. Sometimes these same references aren't

zeroed, but **replaced by jump instructions using RVA to the same import address**, as well known as “IAT obfuscation”.

- As used in shellcodes and common malware, **API names are hashed**.
- The **translation from native register to virtualized register is usually one-to-one, but not always**. Furthermore, there is a context switch component that is responsible for transferring registers and flag information into the virtual machine context.
- **Virtual machines handlers come from data blocks**.
- Many native **APIs are redirected to stub code that forwards the call**.
- Obfuscation techniques such as **constant unfolding, pattern-based obfuscation, control indirection, inline functions, code duplication** and mainly **opaque predicate** are used.

Before and during the unpacking task, there're many observations and questions that we could think about:

- Is the malware **really packed**?
- What are the **evidences of having a packed code**?
- Does the malware perform **self-injection** or **remote injection**?
- Does the malware perform **self-overwriting**?
- **Where is the payload being written**?
- **How** the payload is **going to be executed**?
- What are **evidenced of having an unpacked code** after the unpacking procedure?
- Are there **additional packed layers**?

The first point of the list above rises a key question: **how do we know whether a malware is really packed?**

There isn't an easy and definitive answer to this question, but eventually a set of two or more evidences could indicate that sample is packed:

- The binary sample has **few imported DLLs and functions**.
- There are many **obfuscated strings**.
- Existence of **specific system calls**.
- **Non-standard section names**.
- **Non-common executable binary sections** (only .text/.code section should be executable)
- **Unexpected writable sections**.
- **High entropy sections** (usually above 7.0, but not always – this is a weak indicator).
- **Substantial difference between the raw size and the virtual size of a section**.
- **Zero-sized sections**.
- **Missing APIs related to network communication**.
- **Lack of essential APIs for the malware functionalities (Crypt\* functions in a ransomware, for example)**.
- **Unusual file format and headers**.
- **Entry-point pointing to other section than .text/.code section**.
- Significant size of **resource section** (.rsrc section) followed by **LoadResource( )** function in the code.
- Presence of an **overlay**.
- Opening it up on IDA Pro and observing a big amount of **data or unexplored code on colored bar**.



It's very relevant and suitable to highlight one point: **the occurrence of only one characteristic from the list above doesn't determine that the malware is packed**. Thus, it's quite important to consider two or more of them. Furthermore, there are further observations to be considered:

- Most samples resolve dynamically their APIs using **LoadLibrary( )** followed by **GetProcAddress( )**, for example (**except on reflective code injection cases**).
- **Network APIs** also could be **dynamically resolved**.
- **Malformed headers** might be a bit **difficult to detect** at the first analysis.
- **Big resource section might not be relevant** because it might contain only GUI artifacts and digital certificates.
- There might be a **mix of encrypted/obfuscated strings and plain text strings**, so making a bit harder to decide whether the binary is or not packed.

The unpacking procedure using a debugger might bring a list of **challenges to be understood and bypassed**:

- **Anti-debugging techniques** (time checking, CPUID, heap checking, debugging flag checking, **NtSetInformationThread( )**, and so on), so it's recommended to use an **anti-debugger plugin such as ScyllaHide** (<https://github.com/x64dbg/ScyllaHide>) on **x64dbg/x32dbg** or even **StrongOD on OllyDbg** (there're some repositories containing OllyDbg and all associated useful plugins already built-in. Use Google for finding them).
- **Anti-VM tricks** checking for VMware, VirtualBox, Hyper-V and Qemu artifacts, for example.
- **Filename, hostname and account checking** (avoid using the hash as filename).
- **Available disk size on virtual machine** (it's recommended 100 GB, at least)
- **Number of processors on the testing virtual machine** (two or more would be suitable)
- **Uptime** (try to keep a virtual machine snapshot with uptime above 20 minutes).
- Many **non-sense calls** (result is not used any longer) and **non-existing APIs (fake APIs)**.
- **Exception handlers** being used as anti-debugging technique.
- **Software breakpoints being cleared** and **registers (DR#) being manipulated** (anti-breakpoint techniques)
- **Hash functions using typical algorithms** (for example, crc32, conti, add\_ror13,...) being used.
- **Malicious code checking for well-known tools such Process Hacker, Process Explorer, Process Monitor** and so on (it's recommended to rename these executable binaries before using them).

Unfortunately, **anti-VM tricks** and **anti-debugger techniques cannot be always handled by plugins and we will have to manage to bypass them using the debugger**. In this case, we have an interesting possibility of using a different debugger like **WinDbg** to manage some malware threats expecting for **ring 3 debuggers only and not kernel debuggers** (a recent case is the **GuLoader** malware).

Even during or after unpacking procedures, **we could need to fix the resulting binary** because one or more of following issues:

- The **DOS/PE header could have been destroyed** on the memory **or modified** by a compress library.
- In many cases, when you extract a binary from memory, **you need to clean it up because there's some garbage before its DOS header (MZ signature) and PE header**.



- The **entry-point (EP)** could have been **zeroed or wrong**.
- The unpacked binary might have its **Import table destroyed** due to the fact it has been dumped and its address refers to virtual addresses (**mapped version** instead of **unmapped version**), so showing **unaligned sections** or **none section**.
- **Base address is wrong**.
- **PE format's field presents some inconsistency**.
- It could be **hard to determine the OEP (Original Entry Point)**, which usually appears after a transition from unpacker code using an indirect call (**call [eax]** or **jmp [eax]**, for example). Additionally, **existence of non-resolved APIs could be an evidence of the malicious code hasn't reached the OEP yet**. On time: **OEP is the entry point (EP) of an executable before it being packed**. After it has been packed, a new EP is associated to packer itself.
- **Mutexes** being used as a kind of **"unlock key" between two unpacking layers**. In this case, the second stage of unpacking doesn't happen without the first stage has happened, and if it's happened, so the mutex existence is confirmed.
- The code might be **executing self-overwriting**.
- The **first stage** of unpacked code **doesn't run from any directory**, but only from a specific one.
- **You can have extracted a decoy binary**. In many real cases, malware authors packs one or more useless executables as decoy to consume time of the analyst. Thus, **it would be wise not believe you've unpacked the correct binary from memory at first attempt**.

This list of issues is very limited and there're endless other possible side effects on unpacked binaries. Of course, distinct solutions for each one of these presented issues exist and they will be explained and given examples in the next articles of this series. Anyway, few approaches for handling some issues are:

- **Copy a good PE header from another executable** (or from the own malware sample) and **align sections** considering whether the unpacked binary is **unmapped (.text section usually starts on 0x400)** or **mapped (.text section usually starts on 0x1000)**.
- **Align sections of an unpacked binary** (mapped addressing) **by fixing its respective Raw Address and Raw size**. This action usually **fixes the Import Table** and makes possible to visualize imported functions without any issues. Pay attention to possible "traps": **some unpacked binaries don't show its Import Table until you've aligned their sections**. However, **other malware threats don't have any function in the Import Table even after you having unpacked the binary**, so it doesn't mean you made any mistake, but it does that the **malware resolve all its APIs dynamically**.
- **Reconstruct the IAT and forcing the OEP (Original Entry Point)**.

- If you're facing problems in finding the OEP, so remember that **OEP likely comes after the IAT has been resolved**. In this case, **one of possible approaches would be to check whether IAT is already resolved (check for Intermodular Calls on x64dbg or OllyDbg) or setting a breakpoint on a critical API that would be executed during a key operation of malware (CryptoAcquireContext( ) in ransomware threats, for example) because certainly IAT will be resolved when execution reaches these critical APIs**. Afterwards, the suggestion is **looking for unconditional jumps to specific memory addresses or even indirect calls (call [eax], for example)**. Another interesting approach would be **using the graphical visualization of a debugger ("g" on x64dbg) and check for these transition points (indirect calls or unconditional jumps for memory addresses) at the last "code blocks"**. Finally, a specialized tool might help you to find out the OEP. As you've noticed, there isn't a single approach to do this.
- **Adjust the base address** to match with the segment's base address dumped from memory.
- **To detect malware performing self-overwriting**, we could try to **set a breakpoint on the .text/.code section**. In this case, we could choose to trigger this breakpoint during code writing or execution.
- In two-stage unpacking cases, the **first unpacked binary might be a DLL**. Therefore, depending on the context, **it might be useful to convert the DLL binary to executable**, and there're many ways to accomplish this task, **but my favorite method is editing the PE header to alter the Characteristics field and make the entry of the exported function as an entry-point**.

**To visualize, handle and fix most of issues** after unpacking a binary you can use the following well-know tools such as:

- **PEBear** is an excellent tool **written by Aleksandra Doniec (a.k.a Hasherezade)** that's used to visualize details of a PE Header and fix many binary issues. You can download this tool from: <https://github.com/hasherezade/pe-bear-releases>
- **Pestudio** is a great tool **written by Marc Ochseneier** and it's mainly used to triage and collect different information of a potential malware. The tool (free and paid versions) are available here: <https://www.winitor.com/features>
- **CFF Explorer**, which makes part of Explorer Suite, it's an well-known PE Editor that is used to visualize and fix PE headers. The Explorer Suite can be downloaded from: [https://ntcore.com/?page\\_id=388](https://ntcore.com/?page_id=388)
- **pe\_unmapper** is another tool **written by Aleksandra Doniec (a.k.a Hasherezade)** that can be used for converting a PE binary from mapped version to unmapped version, so fixing all PE alignment issues. This tool can be downloaded from: [https://github.com/hasherezade/libpeconv/tree/master/pe\\_unmapper](https://github.com/hasherezade/libpeconv/tree/master/pe_unmapper)

- **Scylla** is an amazing x86/x64 Import Reconstructor that is already embedded in x64dbg. If you need the standalone version, so you can download it from: <https://github.com/NtQuery/Scylla>
- **HxD** is an excellent hex-editor that we could be used, for example, to check and fix PE headers manually. It can be downloaded from: <https://mh-nexus.de/en/hxd/>
- **XVI32 Hex Editor** is another interesting hex-editor that is great to clean up dumped memory regions to isolate the unpacked binary. XVI32 Hex Editor can be downloaded from: <http://www.chmaas.handshake.de/delphi/freeware/xvi32/xvi32.htm>

Once again, remember that unpacking is only the first obstacle during malware analysis, and many other hard challenges such as string de-obfuscation, API resolving, C2 configuration extraction, C2 emulation and other topics are also in our list. This project will cover several unpacking situations and all of these mentioned tasks in the next articles.

Now we have a minimal knowledge about unpacking process, issues and solutions, it's time to review different code injection techniques, which could help you to have a better comprehension about unpacking.

## 6. Code Injection Review

Code injection is a supported operation on Windows systems and, of course, it's a quite useful evasion method due to the fact that a malware is able to inject (write) a malicious code into a memory region (some people use the term "segment") of the process itself (self-injection) or a remote one (remote injection), and this payload will be executed on the target context as whether it made part of it and without leaving many evidences. Furthermore, the source process (malware) can cleanly terminate itself while the malicious payload continues being running in a supposedly good process (for example, explorer.exe and svchost.exe). At the end, it's a stealth approach for evading security defenses.

It's quite interesting to figure out that a long list of mitigations and protections such as **Code Integrity Guard, Extension Point Disable Policy, Control Flow Guard, Code Integrity Guard, Dynamic Code Restriction and Arbitrary Code Guard** (a kind of update of Dynamic Code Restriction) exist since Windows 8.1 (mainly Windows 10 and 11) and it isn't so easy to perform code injection on these Windows versions without being detected and prevented. Further information about these mitigation and protection can be read on: <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/overview-of-threat-mitigations-in-windows-10> , <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/customize-exploit-protection> and <https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/core-infrastructure-and-security/windows-10-memory-protection-features/ba-p/259046>.

There are excellent public documents explaining several code injection techniques, but at a summarized way, the main **code injection techniques** are the following ones:

- **DLL Injection:** this old technique is used to force a process to load a DLL. Main potentially involved APIs: **OpenProcess( )**, **VirtualAllocEx( )**, **WriteProcessMemory** and **CreateRemoteThread | NtCreateThread( ) | RtlCreateUserThread( )**.

- **PE Injection:** in this technique a malicious code is written and, consequently, forced to be executed in a remote process or even in the own process (self-injection). Main related APIs: **OpenThread( )**, **SuspendThread( )**, **VirtualAllocEx( )**, **WriteProcessMemory( )**, **SetThreadContext( )** and **ResumeThread( )** | **NtResumeThread( )**.
- **Reflective Injection:** this technique is similar to PE Injection, but the malicious code avoid using **LoadLibrary( )** and **CreateRemoteThread( )**, for example. There're many interesting derivations of this method and, one of them (also used on **Cobalt Strike**) is accomplished by the following APIs: **CreateFileMapping( )**, **Nt/MapViewOfFile( )**, **OpenProcess( )**, **memcpy( )** and **Nt/MapViewOfSection( )**. At end, code on remote process can be executed by calling **OpenProcess( )**, **CreateThread( )**, **NtQueueApcThread( )**, **CreateRemoteThread( )** or **RtlCreateUserThread( )**. It's interesting to note that a variant could use **VirtualQueryEx( )** and **ReadProcessMemory( )** too.
- **APC Injection:** this code injection technique allows a program to execute code in a specific thread by attaching to an APC queue. The injected code will be executed by the thread when it exits of alertable state (originated by calls such as **SleepEx( )**, **SignalObjectAndWait( )**, **MsgWaitForMultipleObjectsEx( )**, **WaitForMultipleObjectsEx( )**, or **WaitForSingleObjectEx( )**). Therefore, it's common to also see APIs such as **CreateToolhelp32Snapshot()**, **Process32First( )**, **Process32Next( )**, **Thread32First( )**, **Thread32Next( )**, **QueueUserAPC( )** and **KelInitializeAPC( )** involved into this technique.
- **Hollowing or Process Replacement:** this technique, in a nutshell, is used by the malware to "drain out" the entire content of a process and insert into it a malicious content. Some involved APIs are **CreateProcess( )**, **NtQueryProcessInformation( )**, **GetModuleHandle( )**, **Zw/NtUnmapViewOfSection( )**, **VirtualAllocEx( )**, **WriteProcessMemory( )**, **GetThreadContext( )**, **SetThreadContext( )** and **ResumeThread( )**.
- **AtomBombing:** this technique is an a variant of the previous technique (APC injection) and works by splitting the malicious payload into separated strings, creating an Atom to each given string, copying them into a RW segment (using **GlobalGetAtomName( )** and **NtQueueApcThread( )**) and setting the context by using **NtSetContextThread( )**. Therefore, a list of further APIs are **OpenThread( )**, **GlobalAddAtom( )**, **GlobalGetAtomName( )** and **QueueUserAPC( )**.
- **Process Doppelgänger:** this technique could be handled as a kind of evolution of Process Hollowing. The key difference between this both techniques is that while Process Hollowing replaces the process's content (image) before it being resumed, Process Doppelgänger is able to replace the image before the process even being created by overwriting the target image with a malicious one before it being loaded. The key concept here is that NTFS operations are performed within transactions, so either all these operations inside a transactions are committed together or none of them are committed. In the meanwhile, the malicious image only exists and it's visible inside the transaction and it isn't visible to any other process. Therefore, the malicious image is loaded into memory and the malware drops the malicious payload from file system (by rollbacking the transaction) as the file never had existed previously. Some APIs are involved in this technique:

**CreateTransaction( ), CreateFileTransaction( ), NtCreateSection, NtCreateProcessEx( ), NtQueryInformationProcess( ), NtCreateThreadEx( ) and RollbackTransaction( ).**

- **Process Herpaderping:** this technique is similar to Process Doppelgänger, but there's a subtle difference in its procedure. Process Herpaderping is based on that fact that security defenses usually monitor process creation by registering a callback routine on the kernel side using **PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx( )** or during driver's **DispatchCleanup routines (IRP\_MJ\_CLEANUP)**, which it is invoked after a thread being created. That's the key issue: if the an adversary create and map a process and, afterwards, this adversary is able to modify the file image and then create the thread, so security products are able to detect such a malicious payload. Nonetheless, this checking order can be comprised whether the adversary is able to create malicious binary on disk, open a handle to it, map it as an image section using **NtCreateSection function** (and including the **SEC\_IMAGE flag**), create a process using the section handle (**NtCreateProcessEx()**), modify the file content to not sounds like malicious and create a thread (**NtCreateThreadEx()**) using this "good image". That the point: when the thread is created, the process callback is triggered and the content of the file (good one) on disk is checked, so security defenses believes that everything is fine because image on disk is not harmful, but the true malicious is on memory. In other words, security defenses could not be effective to detect such image on disk that is different from image on memory. Few APIs used for this technique: **CreateFile( ), NtCreateSection( ), NtCreateProcessEx( ) and NtCreateThreadEx( ).**
- **Hooking Injection:** to use this technique, we will see that functions involved with hooking activities such as **SetWindowsHookEx( )** and **PostThreadMessage( )** are used to inject a malicious DLL.
- **Extra Windows Memory Injection:** using this technique, malware threats injects code into the a process by using the *Extra Windows Memory (as known as EWM)*, whose size is up to 40 bytes and it's appended the instance of a class during the registration of windows classes. The trick is that the appended spaced is enough to store a pointer that might forward the execution to a malicious code. Some possible APIs involved to this technique are **FindWindowsA( ), GetWindowThreadProcessId( ), OpenProcess( ), VirtualAllocEx( ), WriteProcessMemory( ), SetWindowLongPtrA( ) and SendNotify( ).**
- **Propagate Injection:** this technique has been used by malware threats such as RIG Exploit Kit and Smoke Loader to inject malicious code into explorer.exe process (medium integrity level) and other persistent ones, and it's based on the approach of enumerating (**EnumWindows( ) → EnumWindowsProc → EnumChildWindows( ) → EnumChildWindowsProc → EnumProps( ) → EnumPropsProc → GetProp**) windows implementing **SetWindowsSubclass( )** (this further information on <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/commctrl/nf-commctrl-setwindowssubclass>). As you could remember, this function install a windows subclass callback and, as you know, callbacks are interpreted as hooking methods in the security world. How does it works? Once subclassed windows are found (checking **UxSubclassInfo** and/or **CC32SubclassInfo**, which provide the subclass header), it's possible to preserve the old windows procedure, but we can also assign a new one to the window by updating **CallArray** field. When an event to the target process is sent then the new procedure is called and, afterwards, the old one is also called (keeping

the previous and expected behavior). Therefore, a malware inserts a malicious payload (shellcode) into the memory and updates subclass procedure using **SetPropA( )**. When this new property is invoked (through a windows message) , the execution is forwarded to the payload. Some Windows APIs involved to this technique are **FindWindow( )**, **FindWindowEx( )**, **GetProp( )**, **GetWindowThreadProcessId( )**, **OpenProcess( )**, **ReadProcessMemory( )**, **VirtualAllocEx( )**, **WriteProcessMemory( )**, **SetProp( )** and **PostMessage( )**.

This short and quick review about code injection techniques will be useful to understand how malware try to keep undetected and also indirectly will help you to understand unpacking techniques.

A quite usual example of a code injection sequence from malware threats is shown below (a decompiled output from IDA Pro) and, certainly, you'll be able to identify the technique used through information presented previously in this section:

```
Buffer[3] = (int)&v10;
Buffer[6] = 0;
v3 = GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll");
NtUnmapViewOfSection = (NTSTATUS (__stdcall *) (HANDLE, PVOID))GetProcAddress(v3, "NtUnmapViewOfSection");
v12 = lpBuffer;
if ( *( _WORD *)lpBuffer != 'ZM' )
    goto LABEL_17;
v4 = (char *)lpBuffer + *((_DWORD *)lpBuffer + 15);
Buffer[1] = (int)v4;
if ( *( _DWORD *)v4 != 'EP' )
    goto LABEL_17;
memset(&StartupInfo, 0, sizeof(StartupInfo));
lpProcessInformation->hProcess = 0;
lpProcessInformation->hThread = 0;
lpProcessInformation->dwProcessId = 0;
lpProcessInformation->dwThreadId = 0;
if ( !CreateProcessW(0, lpCommandLine, 0, 0, 0, 4u, 0, 0, &StartupInfo, lpProcessInformation) )
    goto LABEL_17;
v5 = (CONTEXT *)VirtualAlloc(0, 4u, 0x1000u, 4u);
lpContext = v5;
v5->ContextFlags = 0x10007;
if ( !GetThreadContext(lpProcessInformation->hThread, v5)
    || !ReadProcessMemory(lpProcessInformation->hProcess, (LPCVOID)(v5->Ebx + 8), Buffer, 4u, 0) )
{
    goto LABEL_17;
}
if ( Buffer[0] == *((_DWORD *)v4 + 13) )
    NtUnmapViewOfSection(lpProcessInformation->hProcess, (PVOID)Buffer[0]);
v6 = (char *)VirtualAllocEx(
    lpProcessInformation->hProcess,
    *((LPVOID *)v4 + 13),
    *((_DWORD *)v4 + 20),
    0x3000u,
    0x40u);
v14 = v6;
if ( !v6 )
    goto LABEL_17;
if ( !WriteProcessMemory(lpProcessInformation->hProcess, v6, lpBuffer, *((_DWORD *)v4 + 21), 0) )
    goto LABEL_17;
v7 = 0;
v16 = 0;
while ( v7 < *((unsigned __int16 *)v4 + 3) )
{
    v15 = (char *)lpBuffer + 40 * v7 + *((_DWORD *)lpBuffer + 15) + 248;
    WriteProcessMemory(lpProcessInformation->hProcess, &v14[v15[3]], (char *)lpBuffer + v15[5], v15[4], 0);
    v7 = ++v16;
}
if ( WriteProcessMemory(lpProcessInformation->hProcess, (LPVOID)(lpContext->Ebx + 8), v4 + 52, 4u, 0)
    && (v8 = lpContext,
        lpContext->Eax = (DWORD)&v14[*((_DWORD *)v4 + 10)],
        SetThreadContext(lpProcessInformation->hThread, v8))
    && ResumeThread(lpProcessInformation->hThread) != -1 )
{
    result = 1;
}
```

[Figure 4]



## 7. Unpacking Methods

It's quite complicated to classify and, mainly, describe unpacking techniques, but in a general way there're few methods to unpack a malware sample such as using a debugger, an automated tool, a web service or even writing its own unpacking code to accomplish the task statically. The chosen methods depends on specific contexts and situations.

### a. Debugger + breakpoint on specific functions

This is the most known method and consist on loading the malware into a debugger and setting up software breakpoints on well-known APIs, which most of them are related to memory management and manipulation, and looking for executables and/or shellcode to be extracted from the memory. Using x64dbg/x32dbg (**[ctrl]+g** or **bp <function>** on its CLI) is really simple to insert software breakpoints on the following APIs:

- **CreateProcessInternalW( )**
- **VirtualAlloc( )**
- **VirtualAllocEx( )**
- **VirtualProtect( ) | ZwProtectVirtualMemory( )**
- **WriteProcessMemory( ) | NtWriteProcessMemory( )**
- **ResumeThread( ) | NtResumeThread( )**
- **CryptDecrypt( ) | RtlDecompressBuffer( )**
- **NtCreateSection( ) + MapViewOfSection( ) | ZwMapViewOfSection( )**
- **UnmapViewOfSection( ) | ZwUnmapViewOfSection( )**
- **NtWriteVirtualMemory( )**
- **NtReadVirtualMemory( )**

During the unpacking procedure we might face some issues (for example, anti-debugging techniques being used by the malware) and other side effects. Therefore, some notes before and after unpacking could be useful:

- Set up breakpoints **after malware has reached its entry point** (after the system breakpoint).
- As mentioned previously, it's recommended to use an anti-debugging plugin and, in few cases, to ignore all exceptions from **0x00000000 to 0xFFFFFFFF range** (on x64dbg, go to **Options → Preferences → Exceptions** to include this range).
- Sometimes ignoring exceptions could be a bad idea because malware could be them to call the unpacking procedure. Additionally (and out of the context in this article) **there are threats that use interruptions and exceptions to call APIs**.
- Learning about all listed **APIs and their respective arguments by using MSDN** is a key knowledge to unpack malware threats successfully.



- If you're using **VirtualAlloc( )**, it's recommended to setup the **breakpoint on its exit point** (ret 10). Additionally, sometimes it is easier to follow the allocated content on dump by setting a **write memory breakpoint**.
- In some cases, the malware extracts its payload onto memory, but it **destroys the PE Header**, so you'll have **reconstruct the entire header**, though it's simple procedure using a hex editor like HxD.
- The extracted payload might be in mapped or unmapped format. If it's in mapped format, so probably the Import table is messed up and you need to fix them by **realigning sections headers** manually through PEBear (favorite method) or using a tool like **pe\_unmapper**. You might need to **fix the base address and the entry point** whether it's zeroed.
- **To reconstruct a destroyed IAT it's recommended to use Scylla** (embedded on x64dbg). It will be necessary to enter the OEP and one of methods to find it is by looking for code transitions given by instructions such as **jmp eax, call eax, call [eax]**, and so on.
- Few unpacked malware samples don't have any function in the IAT, so there're two possibilities: **either sections are misaligned (mapped version) or the unpacked malware resolves all its functions dynamically**.
- Using the **"g" hotkey on x64dbg** might be useful for visualizing the code in blocks and finding possible transitions to OEP.
- **Another good alternative to find OEP** is through code instrumentation like **PIN** (<https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/tool/pin-a-dynamic-binary-instrumentation-tool.html>).
- Tools like **tiny\_tracer** ([https://github.com/hasherezade/tiny\\_tracer](https://github.com/hasherezade/tiny_tracer)) use PIN to perform instrumentation easier and can be used to learn about functions being called by the malware (quite useful for unpacking and learning about anti-analysis techniques) and also to find possible OEP.
- In many opportunities, the **unpacked code could be only the first stage** of a malware, so it's necessary to repeat steps to unpack the next stages.
- Few malware sample perform **self-overwriting**, so you could have to set a breakpoint on the **.text section** to detect the unpacked binary execution.
- Depending on the extracted binary (a shellcode, for example), **it might not be able to run out of a specific process context, so it'd be necessary to inject it into a running process** (for example, explorer.exe) to perform further analysis.
- How can you check whether the extracted malware might be the final one? There isn't a definitive answer and few indications might be found by looking for network functions from DLLs such as **WS2\_32.dll** (Winsock) and **Wininet.dll**, **plain text strings**, **crypto functions** (mainly whether

malware is an ransomware), and many other evidences. It's a good approach to **open up the extracted code on IDA Pro mainly after having re-aligned sections and/or reconstructed the IAT**.

#### **b. Debugger + break on DLL loading**

This an old and simple technique to unpack malware by stopping the debugger on each DLL loaded and examining the memory mapping for potentially extracted PE format files on the memory (pay attention: don't focus only on RWX segments because many malwares extracts its payload in RW regions and soon before transferring the execution context to the extracted executable they change the region's permissions to RWX by using **VirtualProtect( )** . No doubts it can consume some time, but It continues being efficient in many cases. Common debuggers (**x64dbg**, **OllyDbg** and **Immunity Debugger**) have a configuration option to break on each DLL loading. On x64dbg this option is in **Options → Preferences → Events** and mark **DLL load**. On OllyDbg you can go to **Options → Debugging Options → Events** and mark "Break on new module (DLL)".

#### **c. Automated method**

A malware analyst can use tools to automate the unpacking procedure. **Aleksandra Doniec (Hasherezade)** has provided excellent tools to attend this objective:

- **hollows-hunter:** [https://github.com/hasherezade/hollows\\_hunter/releases](https://github.com/hasherezade/hollows_hunter/releases)
- **pe-sieve:** <https://github.com/hasherezade/pe-sieve/releases>
- **mal\_unpack:** [https://github.com/hasherezade/mal\\_unpack/releases](https://github.com/hasherezade/mal_unpack/releases)

Her tools has a similar approach to each other, so you should run the malware in an isolated virtual machine and execute the appropriate command, which I show some syntax examples below that can be used for a quick approach, though all of these tools contain useful options and it's worth to check them:

- **hollow\_hunter.exe /pname <filename> /loop /imp**
- **mal\_unpack.exe /exe <filename> /timeout <timeout: ms>**
- **pe-sieve64.exe /pid <process ID>**
- **pe-sieve64.exe /pid <process ID> /dmode 3 /imp 3**

The unpacked binaries with some additional information are saved into a directory created by the tool.

#### **d. Process Hacker**

Another trivial (and limited) way to extract binaries from memory is through **Process Hacker** by double-clicking on the running process, going to "**Memory**" tab, looking for **interesting regions/base addresses (RWX)**, double-clicking it and pressing "Save" button. Of course, it's easier finding the malicious binary/payload in case of self-injection. In case of remote injection you'll need to reverse the malware to understand the target process to be inject or make an "educated guess" and look for the injected code on well-known targets like explorer.exe or svchost.exe, for example. Once again, it's a limited and simple approach, but sometimes can save time.

#### **e. Using an public/paid Internet service**

You can use an Internet service as the amazing **Unpacme** (<https://www.unpac.me/#/>), which offers an automated unpacking service. There're a free and public plan (10 submissions per month) and other paid plans that are quite interesting for researchers and companies. Furthermore, it offers an API set to interface your customized application with the Unpacme service (<https://api.unpac.me/>).

## f. Writing an unpacker code


Although this approach sounds being time consuming, it's quite usual **writing Python code** to accomplish unpacking mainly in shellcode cases or while handling a case which a malware threads use several anti-vm and anti-debugging techniques. In addition, we have an advantage to automate the unpacking process while handling similar malware cases.

## 8. Unpacking the binary

Now we made a fast review about fundamentals of malware analysis, let's start our analysis. As I've already explained previously, I picked up this sample because it's quite simple and, in my opinion, it will be useful to start our series of articles. Remember this sample has the following SHA256 hash:

**8ff43b6ddf6243bd5ee073f9987920fa223809f589d151d7e438fd8cc08ce292.**


Checking it using **PEBear** could be useful to collect first valuable information from malware:



[Figure 5]


As we can see, there isn't any DLL (and functions) at IAT directly related to network communication, crypto or something really interesting. Therefore, it's a first indication that our sample might be packed.

As this malware sample is a DLL, so we can learn about its **exported functions** because we'll use them to run the malware on the x64dbg/x32dbg:



[Figure 6]

Using **pestudio tool** we are able to figure out a meaning difference between raw size and virtual size on .data section, which is also marked as “writable”. It’s an additional indication that our sample might be packed, as we expected.




[Figure 7]

Our malware sample has five exported functions and, without analyzing it on IDA Pro, it's hard to guess what they really do. However, we could try the first one named "Callrun" that, apparently, it's a good bet. Therefore, using **x32dbg** (this binary is 32-bit), we can run it by open the **rundll32.exe** and changing the command line (**File → Change Command Line**) to "**C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe**" **C:\Users\Administrador\Desktop\sample\_1.bin,#1**.

After changing it, restart/reload the debugging session and set up the following breakpoints on few classical functions (you can do it using **CTRL+G** or even the **x32dbg** command line interface) **after you have reached the entry point**:


- **VirtualAlloc** (on its exit point)
- **VirtualProtect**
- **ResumeThread**

Run (**F9**) and, after hitting the first breakpoint (on **VirtualAlloc()**), right click on **EAX** and pick "**Follow In Dump**". The second hit will be in the same region and on the third hit you can right-click on the **EAX** and choose "Follow in Dump 2". If you wanted (not necessary here), you might go to the "**Dump 2**" tab, select the first four hex bytes, **right click → Breakpoint → Memory, Write → Singleshot** (it could be useful in case where malware take a long time to write on that region). If everything goes right (I hope) you'll see an image similar to the following one:




[Figure 8]

As you can see, first characters on ASCII representation are **“M8Z”**, which suggests it’s using **aPLib compression**. However, if you dump this region, you’ll find out the unpacked binary at the same region. Therefore, right-click on bytes from the **“Dump 2”** tab and choose **“Follow in Memory Map”** option:






Once you found it, you should look for “MZ” characters on two or three lines before. Now, put the cursor at byte before the “MZ” mark, **go to Edit → Delete to cursor** as shown in the next couple of figures:




[Figure 11]



[Figure 12]

Save it, open it on **PEBear** and go to **Imports tab** as shown below:




[Figure 13]



As you can confirm, the IAT is perfect, there is one DLL related to network communication (**WININET.dll**) and you also can see a slightly different **Entry Point (EP)**. Therefore, it seems being our first stage unpacked (you should always assume that might have further packed stages and to repeat the same analysis unless you have an external information from other source or report). At this point, you can close the x32dbg because we won't need it anymore.

## 9. Reversing the decryption code

Now we have the unpacked binary, so let's open it up in IDA Pro. There're many ways to find encrypted configuration, but certainly one of easier (and a bit inaccurate) is by **looking for functions manipulating Data or Unexplored areas of color bars on IDA Pro** (actually, the unexplored area is much bigger than the shown below):



[Figure 14]

Clicking on the start of the Unexplored area above, you'll see the following code:

```
.data:10004000 ; Segment type: Pure data
.data:10004000 ; Segment permissions: Read/Write
.data:10004000 _data segment para public 'DATA' use32
.data:10004000 _data assume cs:_data
.data:10004000 ;org 10004000h
.data:10004000 byte_10004000 db 10h ; DATA XREF: sub_10001CB7+F;w
.data:10004001 a0PP2400 db ' 0@P`p€24.00',0
.data:1000400E align 10h
.data:10004010 ; BYTE pbData
.data:10004010 pbData db 0C5h ; DATA XREF: sub_10001CB7+2D;o
.data:10004011 db 8Bh ; <
.data:10004012 db 0
.data:10004013 db 15h
.data:10004014 db 7Fh ; []
.data:10004015 db 8Eh ; ž
.data:10004016 db 92h ; '
.data:10004017 db 88h ; ^
.data:10004018 unk_10004018 db 5Bh ; [ ; DATA XREF: sub_10001CB7+1B;o
.data:10004019 db 2
.data:1000401A db 6
.data:1000401B db 4Dh ; M
.data:1000401C db 55h ; U
.data:1000401D db 0CBh ; Ě
.data:1000401E db 0A8h ; "
.data:1000401F db 0E0h ; à
.data:10004020 db 4Ah ; J
.data:10004021 db 0EFh ; i
.data:10004022 db 0FCh ; ù
.data:10004023 db 0BEh ; ¾
.data:10004024 db 7
```

[Figure 15]

It's quite interesting to notice that we see cross references to specific addresses in this region:

- **byte\_10004000** (16 bytes)
- **pbData** (8 bytes)
- **unk\_10004018** (likely 0x2000 bytes)

From my experience analyzing malware, I already know that **pbData** is an important argument to a couple of APIs from Microsoft Crypto APIs, so it's an indicative that we are in the right track. Another pattern found in many well-known malware sample is the **structure key + encrypted data**, so even I don't have any further indication about this case, I could suppose that "pbData" is some key (length of 8 bytes), though sometimes it isn't the final key because malicious threats use **KDF (Key Derivation Functions)** to generate a definitive key from the provided password. Following our analysis, the "**unk10004018**" would be referring to the potentially encrypted data.

Although we're going well in the analysis, I mentioned previously this kind of "reverse thinking" is not precise because we don't actually know what the nature of the encrypted data that is stored at this address location. It would be better to analyze the malware and, from important references and functions that take these data, so we could have a better idea and context about data type involved here.

Following the cross-reference on **pbData (X hotkey)** we get to the subroutine **sub\_10001CB7**. From this point, we clearly see our data (**pbData**) is being pushed onto the stack as argument to subroutine **sub\_10002131**, as shown below:

```
.text:10001CB7 sub_10001CB7 proc near ; CODE XREF: sub_1000153C+74↑p
.text:10001CB7 ; sub_1000153C:loc_100015C1↑p ...
.text:10001CB7 mov     eax, dword_10006264
.text:10001CBC test     eax, eax
.text:10001CBE jnz     short locret_10001CFE
.text:10001CC0 push    esi
.text:10001CC1 mov     esi, 2000h
.text:10001CC6 mov     byte_10004000, al
.text:10001CCB push    esi ; dwBytes
.text:10001CCC call    sub_100011A4
.text:10001CD1 push    esi
.text:10001CD2 push    offset unk_10004018
.text:10001CD7 push    eax
.text:10001CD8 mov     dword_10006264, eax
.text:10001CDD call    sub_10001214
.text:10001CE2 push    8 ; dwDataLen
.text:10001CE4 push    offset pbData ; pbData
.text:10001CE9 push    esi ; pdwDataLen
.text:10001CEA push    dword_10006264 ; BYTE *
.text:10001CF0 call    sub_10002131
.text:10001CF5 mov     eax, dword_10006264
.text:10001CFA add     esp, 20h
.text:10001CFD pop     esi
```

[Figure 16]

Observing other arguments and based on my previous experience, I know that other arguments being passed to subroutine **sub\_10002131** are also involved with Cryptography. Please, we should also see that **dwBytes** (from esi register, which received the value of 0x2000) is being used as an argument to subroutine **sub\_100011A4**, which only performs buffer allocation to receive a content, as shown below:

```
.text:100011A4 sub_100011A4      proc near                                ; CODE XREF: sub_10001267+1F↓p
.text:100011A4                                         ; sub_100013F6+F↓p ...
.text:100011A4 dwBytes      = dword ptr  8
.text:100011A4      push     ebp
.text:100011A5      mov      ebp, esp
.text:100011A7      mov      eax, hHeap
.text:100011AC      test     eax, eax
.text:100011AE      jnz      short loc_100011C1
.text:100011B0      call     ds:GetProcessHeap
.text:100011B6      mov      hHeap, eax
.text:100011BB      test     eax, eax
.text:100011BD      jnz      short loc_100011C1
.text:100011BF      pop      ebp
.text:100011C0      retn
.text:100011C1 ; -----
.text:100011C1 loc_100011C1:                                ; CODE XREF: sub_100011A4+A↑j
.text:100011C1                                         ; sub_100011A4+19↑j
.text:100011C1      push     [ebp+dwBytes]      ; dwBytes
.text:100011C4      push     0                          ; dwFlags
.text:100011C6      push     eax                          ; hHeap
.text:100011C7      call     ds:HeapAlloc
.text:100011CD      pop      ebp
.text:100011CE      retn
.text:100011CE sub_100011A4      endp
```

[Figure 17]

Analyzing the subroutine **sub\_10002131** (a bit long) in several parts, we have the following code:

```
.text:10002131 ; int cdecl sub_10002131(BYTE *, DWORD pdwDataLen, BYTE *pbData, DWORD dwDataLen)
.text:10002131 sub_10002131      proc near                                ; CODE XREF: sub_10001CB7+39↑p
.text:10002131
.text:10002131 phProv      = dword ptr -0Ch
.text:10002131 phKey       = dword ptr -8
.text:10002131 phHash      = dword ptr -4
.text:10002131 arg_0       = dword ptr  8
.text:10002131 pdwDataLen  = dword ptr  0Ch
.text:10002131 pbData      = dword ptr  10h
.text:10002131 dwDataLen   = dword ptr  14h
.text:10002131
.text:10002131      push     ebp
.text:10002132      mov      ebp, esp
.text:10002134      sub      esp, 0Ch
.text:10002137      push     esi
.text:10002138      push     edi
.text:10002139      push     0F0000000h      ; dwFlags
.text:1000213E      xor      edi, edi
.text:10002140      lea      eax, [ebp+phProv]
.text:10002143      push     1                ; dwProvType
.text:10002145      push     edi                ; szProvider
.text:10002146      push     edi                ; szContainer
.text:10002147      push     eax                ; phProv
.text:10002148      mov      [ebp+phKey], edi
.text:1000214B      mov      esi, edi
.text:1000214D      mov      [ebp+phHash], edi
.text:10002150      mov      [ebp+phProv], edi
.text:10002153      call     ds:CryptAcquireContextA
.text:10002159      test     eax, eax
.text:1000215B      jz       short loc_100021C1
```

[Figure 18]

Although **CryptAcquireContextA( )** is a deprecated function, it continues being very used by malware threats. This API is used **to acquire a handle to a key container with a CSP (Cryptographic Service Provider) and it's using a default key container name and a user default provider because both arguments are zero (from xor edi, edi)**. Taking **dwFlags (0x0F0000000)** and searching this value on **wincrypt.h**, we know that it is referring to **CRYPT\_VERIFYCONTEXT provider type**, which is commonly seen in applications using ephemeral keys or that don't need access to persisted private keys. Actually, as you will learn, this malware sample uses a kind of **key derivation**.

Next block of code reveals important information to our analysis:

```
.text:1000215D      lea     eax, [ebp+phHash]
.text:10002160      push    eax                ; phHash
.text:10002161      push    edi                ; dwFlags
.text:10002162      push    edi                ; hKey
.text:10002163      push    8004h             ; Algid
.text:10002168      push    [ebp+phProv]      ; hProv
.text:1000216B      call    ds:CryptCreateHash
.text:10002171      test    eax, eax
.text:10002173      jz      short loc_100021C1
.text:10002175      push    edi                ; dwFlags
.text:10002176      push    [ebp+dwDataLen]   ; dwDataLen
.text:10002179      push    [ebp+pbData]      ; pbData
.text:1000217C      push    [ebp+phHash]      ; hHash
.text:1000217F      call    ds:CryptHashData
.text:10002185      test    eax, eax
.text:10002187      jz      short loc_100021C1
.text:10002189      lea     eax, [ebp+phKey]
.text:1000218C      push    eax                ; phKey
.text:1000218D      push    280011h           ; dwFlags
.text:10002192      push    [ebp+phHash]      ; hBaseData
.text:10002195      push    6801h             ; Algid
.text:1000219A      push    [ebp+phProv]      ; hProv
.text:1000219D      call    ds:CryptDeriveKey
```

[Figure 19]

This block contains three APIs and we have to analyze them one by one:

**a. CryptCreateHash( ):**

This function creates a **CSP hash object** and only one of its arguments, **Algid**, is quite interesting and it is set to **8004h**.

Searching on <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/seccrypto/alg-id> we are able to learn that **0x8004h means CALG\_SHA1**, so this malware is manipulating **SHA1 hash (160 bits / 20 bytes)**. The return of this function is a handle to the CSP hash object (saved into the **phHash argument**, which was initially zeroed) that is going to be used in the next function.

#### b. CryptHashData( ):

This function adds data (given by **pbData argument**) of an specific size (given by **dwDataLen argument**) into the hash object returned by **CryptCreateHash( )**. Both arguments are the third and fourth arguments of subroutine **sub\_10002131** (Figure 18). Following them, these arguments comes from subroutine **sub\_10001CB7** (Figure 16), which shows that the size is 8 bytes and refers to the possible key (**pbData**). At this point, **CryptHashData( ) function** is ingesting the possible key (**8 bytes**) into the hash object, so generating a **SHA1 hash**. In other words, the malware's code is generating a hash output from an entry and the returned handle from **CryptCreateHash( )** refers to the **CSP hash object**, which holds this hashed data.

#### c. CryptDeriveKey( ):

This function generates *session keys* derived from a given seed data value and, according to its definition, it guarantees that same sessions key will be generated using the same base data, so it's completely suitable for our case because we're decrypting a configuration data. There are two interesting arguments here: a. **AlgId is 0x6801** and **dwFlags is 0x280011**, and we need to discuss about them.

The second argument (**AlgId == 0x6801**) identifies the symmetric encryption algorithm and according to the documentation (<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/seccrypto/alg-id>), **0x6801** means **CALG\_RC4**.

The fourth argument (**dwFlags == 0x280011**) deserves further details. According to documentation (<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/wincrypt/nf-wincrypt-cryptderivekey>): *"The **key size**, representing the length of the key modulus in bits, is set with the **upper 16 bits of this parameter**. Thus, if a 128-bit RC4 session key is to be generated, the value 0x00800000 is combined with any other dwFlags predefined value with a bitwise-OR operation". Thus, **we know the RC4 key has 40 bits (0x28), so it has 5 bytes**. Another part from MSDN documentation tells that "The lower 16 bits of this parameter can be zero or you can specify one or more of the following flags by using the bitwise-OR operator to combine them". Taking the possible values from MSDN page and searching for them on **wincrypt.h** file (ReacOS provides us a sample: [https://doxygen.reactos.org/d7/d4a/wincrypt\\_8h\\_source.html](https://doxygen.reactos.org/d7/d4a/wincrypt_8h_source.html)) we found that **0x11** means **CRYPT\_NO\_SALT + CRYPT\_EXPORTABLE** (both self-explaining).*

Therefore, it's really interesting to figure out that the malware's author is **using SHA1 as a KDF (Key Derivation Function)** to generate the final decryption key, which can be explained by the following sequence:

- a) **pbData = C58B00157F8E9288** (Remember: to export data you should use **SHIFT-E**)
- b) **pbData → SHA1 (20 bytes)**
- c) **SHA1 → CryptHashData( ) → CryptDeriveKey( ) → RC4 key (5 bytes)**

Of course, there're much better **KDF** such as **Bcrypt**, **Script** and **Argon2** that might be used in real applications, but we're sure that malware's author wasn't concerned to aspects of using or not a **KDF resistant to FPGA, ASIC and GPU attacks**.

```
.text:100021A3      test     eax, eax
.text:100021A5      jz       short loc_100021C1
.text:100021A7      lea      eax, [ebp+pdwDataLen]
.text:100021AA      push     eax                ; pdwDataLen
.text:100021AB      push     [ebp+arg_0]        ; pbData
.text:100021AE      push     edi                ; dwFlags
.text:100021AF      push     1                  ; Final
.text:100021B1      push     edi                ; hHash
.text:100021B2      push     [ebp+phKey]        ; hKey
.text:100021B5      call     ds:CryptDecrypt
.text:100021BB      test     eax, eax
.text:100021BD      cmovnz   esi, [ebp+pdwDataLen]
.text:100021C1      loc_100021C1:                ; CODE XREF: sub_10002131+2A↑j
.text:100021C1                                ; sub_10002131+42↑j ...
.text:100021C1      cmp      [ebp+phHash], edi
.text:100021C4      jz       short loc_100021D2
.text:100021C6      push     [ebp+phHash]       ; hHash
.text:100021C9      call     ds:CryptDestroyHash
.text:100021CF      mov      [ebp+phHash], edi
.text:100021D2      loc_100021D2:                ; CODE XREF: sub_10002131+93↑j
.text:100021D2      cmp      [ebp+phKey], edi
.text:100021D5      jz       short loc_100021E3
.text:100021D7      push     [ebp+phKey]        ; hKey
.text:100021DA      call     ds:CryptDestroyKey
.text:100021E0      mov      [ebp+phKey], edi
.text:100021E3      loc_100021E3:                ; CODE XREF: sub_10002131+A4↑j
.text:100021E3      cmp      [ebp+phProv], edi
.text:100021E6      jz       short loc_100021F2
.text:100021E8      push     edi                ; dwFlags
.text:100021E9      push     [ebp+phProv]       ; hProv
.text:100021EC      call     ds:CryptReleaseContext
```

[Figure 20]

#### d. CryptDecrypt( )

This function is responsible for decrypting encrypted data by using a provided handle to the key (**hKey**). Other arguments provided are **hHash** (handle to the hash object resulting from **CryptCreateHash( )**), **Final** (value equal to 1 because is the last and unique section being decrypted), **pbData** (buffer containing the data to be decrypted) and **pbwDataLen** (pointer to a **DWORD** that indicates the **length of the pbData** buffer that, in this case, is **0x2000**).

Remember that **pbwDataLen (0x2000)** is the second argument of the function being analyzed ( *sub\_10002131(BYTE \*rc4\_encrypted\_data, DWORD pdwDataLen, BYTE \*pbData, DWORD dwDataLen)* ). Therefore, the **final result (RC4 decrypted data)** is saved into the **pbData** and the respective size is saved into **pdwDataLen** argument.

Another interesting point is that the **pbData** here is **NOT** the 8-byte key, but the encrypted data coming from **unk\_10004018** data reference that was transferred to **dword\_10006264** memory defined array within the subroutine **sub\_10001214**, which I've renamed its arguments ("N" shortcut), as shown in the next figure:



```
.text:10001214 ; int __cdecl sub_10001214(int data_ptr, _BYTE *encrypted_data, int encrypted_data_size)
.text:10001214 sub_10001214      proc near                               ; CODE XREF: sub_10001000+165↑p
.text:10001214                                         ; sub_10001652+5C↑p ...
.text:10001214
.text:10001214 data_ptr      = dword ptr 8
.text:10001214 encrypted_data = dword ptr 0Ch
.text:10001214 encrypted_data_size= dword ptr 10h
.text:10001214
.text:10001214      push     ebp
.text:10001215      mov      ebp, esp
.text:10001217      mov      eax, [ebp+data_ptr]
.text:1000121A      push     esi
.text:1000121B      mov      esi, [ebp+encrypted_data_size]
.text:1000121E      test     esi, esi
.text:10001220      jz       short loc_10001236
.text:10001222      mov      edx, [ebp+encrypted_data]
.text:10001225      push     edi
.text:10001226      mov      edi, eax
.text:10001228      sub      edi, edx
.text:1000122A
.text:1000122A loc_1000122A:                               ; CODE XREF: sub_10001214+1F↑j
.text:1000122A      mov      cl, [edx]
.text:1000122C      mov      [edi+edx], cl
.text:1000122F      inc      edx
.text:10001230      sub      esi, 1
.text:10001233      jnz      short loc_1000122A
.text:10001235      pop      edi
.text:10001236
.text:10001236 loc_10001236:                               ; CODE XREF: sub_10001214+C↑j
.text:10001236      pop      esi
.text:10001237      pop      ebp
.text:10001238      retn
.text:10001238 sub_10001214      endp
```

[Figure 21]

The remaining functions (**CryptDestroyHash**, **CryptDestroyKey** and **CryptReleaseContext**) have clear meanings and we don't need to explain them here.

Finally we have all necessary information that we are going to use in the next step to write a configuration extractor and decryptor:

- **initial key:** C58B00157F8E9288 (after first 16 bytes of .data section)
- **initial data address:** 0x10004018
- **data size:** 0x2000
- **hash algorithm:** SHA1 (20 bytes)
- **decryption algorithm:** RC4
- **RC4 key size:** 5 bytes

Let's proceed to the next section and write a C2 data configuration extractor and decryptor.

## 10. Writing a data configuration extractor

Writing a configuration extractor is a task that might seem complicated at first time, but this only a matter of learning the path once and, afterwards, you can take your own steps. Additionally, it isn't not a such thing (and not even new from last couple of years) as you could believe, and personally I've being doing it for many years.

Several languages might be used, but I chose Python 3, which have nice features to writing any decoder. I'll try not only to explain what each line does, but also show reasons for each decision.



My data C2 data decryptor code (named **hancitor\_conf\_extractor\_1.py**) follows below:

```
1  import binascii
2  import pefile
3  from Crypto.Cipher import ARC4
4  from Crypto.Hash import SHA
5
6  def extract_data(filename):
7
8      pe=pefile.PE(filename)
9      for section in pe.sections:
10         if ".data" in section.Name.decode(encoding='utf-8').rstrip('x00'):
11             data_start = section.VirtualAddress
12             data_end = section.VirtualAddress + section.SizeOfRawData
13             return section.get_data(section.VirtualAddress, section.SizeOfRawData)
14
15  def data_decryptor(rc4key, encrypted_config):
16
17      rc4_cipher = ARC4.new(rc4key)
18      decrypted_config = rc4_cipher.decrypt(encrypted_config)
19      return decrypted_config
20
21  def main():
22
23      filename = input("Filename: ")
24      dataset = extract_data(filename)
25      dataset2 = dataset[16:]
26      key = (dataset2[:8])
27      encrypted_data = binascii.hexlify(dataset2[8:256])
28      hashed_key = SHA.new(key).hexdigest()
29      true_key = hashed_key[:10]
30      c2_config = data_decryptor(binascii.unhexlify(true_key),binascii.unhexlify(encrypted_data))
31      print("\n\nThe decrypted configuration follows: \n")
32      print(c2_config.decode('utf-8'))
33
34  if __name__ == '__main__':
35      main()
```

[Figure 22]

Let's try to explain line by line of the code, but not at the exact order of the Python 3 script:

- a. **Lines 1, 2, 3 and 4** perform necessary imports because code is manipulating a PE file and this Python 3 script aims to decrypt data involved with RC4 and SHA1 algorithms, as well as it's needed to handle with transformations from binary to ascii, so **binascii package** is required too.
- b. **On lines 21, 22, 23 and 24** we start the **main( )** definition and the code asks for user to enter the filename of an unpacked Hancitor binary which the encrypted data is going to extracted from. The extracted data is stored into the **dataset variable** as bytes.
- c. The **extract\_data( )** (**lines 6 to 13**) doesn't have anything new, but we should to highlight three points: i.) our **target section is the ".data"**, where are stored the key and encrypted data (check Figure 15 ); ii.) we are concerned to **Unicode formatting** and that's the reason of being using **decode(encoding='utf-8')**; iii.) the code is stripping possible '0x00' from section names (common while handling Unicode names); iv.) we're using **PE properties to delimit where the .data section starts and ends**.

- d. **Line 25** (`datasec2 = datasec[16:]`) defines `datasec2` variable that contains **key + all encrypted data except the first 16 bytes**, which is likely related to a campaign ID or something similar.
- e. **Line 26** (`key = (datasec2[:8])`) defines the **key variable** that, as we learned previously, is composed by the **first 8 bytes** of `datasec2`.
- f. **Line 27** (`encrypted_data = binascii.hexlify(datasec2[8:256])`) stores the **encrypted data configuration** into `encrypted_data`. Actually, as we learned from the reversed code, the buffer's size reserved by the binary code is **0x2000**, but as you'll see, collecting **248 bytes is enough**, but you could adjust it according to your needs. The `hexlify()` translates binary data to hexadecimal format.
- g. **Line 28** (`hashed_key = SHA.new(key).hexdigest()`) generates a **hexadecimal SHA1 hash**.
- e. **Line 29** (`true_key = hashed_key[:10]`) collects **only the first 10 hexadecimal (5 bytes)** according to learned from `CryptDeriveKey()` explanation on **page 27**.
- f. **Line 30** (`data_decryptor(binascii.unhexlify(true_key), binascii.unhexlify(encrypted_data))`) calls the decryptor function and one of important facts is that **we must transform data from hexadecimal string to binary representation before using RC4 functions**.
- g. The `data_decryptor()` (lines 15 to 19) is quite simple and basically decrypts the encrypted data through **RC4 algorithm** using the given key (**true\_key variable from line 29**).
- h. Finally, **on line 32** (`print(c2_config.decode('utf-8'))`) the result is sent to terminal. Once again, you should note that before printing the decrypted data we need to decode it **assuming to be handling with a possible Unicode character set**.

Executing this Python 3 script against our unpacked Hancitor binary sample we have:

```
C:\Users\Administrador\Desktop\MAS>hancitor_conf_extractor.py
Filename: unpacked_hancitor.bin
```

The decrypted configuration follows:

```
1910_nsw http://newnucapi.com/8/forum.php|http://gintlyba.ru/8/forum.php|http://stralonz.ru/8/forum.php|
```

[Figure 23]

That's great! We managed to **extract and decrypt the Hancitor C2 configuration** from the unpacked Hancitor binary. The advantage of writing a decryptor script is **that we can use it against all Hancitors sample that follow the same binary pattern**.

To confirm our script, let's look for another Hancitor sample, unpacking it, trying to extract and decrypt its C2 data configuration. **Malware Bazaar** offers an endless number of Hancitor samples and we can use **Malwoverview** to list and download them, as shown on the next figure:

```
remnux@remnux:~$ malwoverview.py -b 2 -B hancitor -o 0 | more
```

#### MALWARE BAZAAR REPORT

```
-----
sha256_hash: 4d21708f0db3c0b39189d2f40d913fb343abf68984e7ac638aedaffb3e014e12
sha1_hash: b51a45f156ca7e002ed05f4eb991e8c242f6bf3e
md5_hash: 918e24301e39c592e082ef4c1df489f9
first_seen: 2021-12-01 19:11:21
file_name: SecuriteInfo.com.Heur.28256.30222
file_size: 668672 bytes
file_type: docx
mime_type: application/msword
tlsh: T1AAE422123CE59E32E6E306319DE2F5C6205CFC9E5E69C64B7690362D7577332CE22A21
reporter: SecuriteInfoCom
signature: Hancitor
tags: docx Hancitor
-----
sha256_hash: 7835d1379c188fc7cc1d4948ca1b175fab9558564ecc32eca0ea4340e8959cc1
sha1_hash: dd07abd964153947143cb0dcc1d4e14d5b178c05
md5_hash: 4026663c0a2c5229149f55b558db7143
first_seen: 2021-12-01 19:11:19
file_name: SecuriteInfo.com.Heur.17389.4268
file_size: 668672 bytes
file_type: docx
mime_type: application/msword
tlsh: T146E422123CE59E32E6A306319DE2F5C6205CFC9E5E69C64F7690362D7577332CE22A21
reporter: SecuriteInfoCom
signature: Hancitor
tags: docx Hancitor
-----
```

[Figure 24]

Collecting many possible **Hancitor** hashes is pretty easy, as shown below (*the listing has been truncated*):

```
remnux@remnux:~$ malwoverview.py -b 2 -B hancitor -o 0 | grep -i sha256_hash
sha256_hash: 4d21708f0db3c0b39189d2f40d913fb343abf68984e7ac638aedaffb3e014e12
sha256_hash: 7835d1379c188fc7cc1d4948ca1b175fab9558564ecc32eca0ea4340e8959cc1
sha256_hash: e8a46c56fc8b0e95e8ccefc3d5122b996f3f8e8256c2d5c24ad817410809ee015
sha256_hash: 9d7c1176515448e1e97dde0b21e7a6f3ea81f313e675fb8cf21858c4e09c9fa3
sha256_hash: 3e7a338e34a7aca828e87cdb996b6728ede0e6cc95ad5219a9d6edaacfd64e43
sha256_hash: 2c19a75d22fd1a7d9b088407217f9b4534ba9c28253ac69b25f4408086285538
sha256_hash: 90df87274d669b237e651489b46d78d5f086e4eefb5f4997444b6108e9094ad8
sha256_hash: 125c2b558cc9cedeee5cd0a0b78c1d7e9056ead0087422f01b52753439fac84f
sha256_hash: 0815e51f957cc4c91957111e6a010c9becc6faa8fefae4d22553f0866937516f
sha256_hash: bd4ea00b1ec65e6bf13be7a9ed69ab0d92fc52d9529025661590875e7842cb54
sha256_hash: 8bf91ee9796419a5aeea1f27ecf8f10b0c8fcac3ab335e51c3e284ccc0527d2d
sha256_hash: bcdcf1ec9bf276c3e6ea441e64ff91fe836857fc49c0c97b672adc0a64aa6873
sha256_hash: 1330a9b1b83a5956ebb74c44a84673a35c1e84a078911e6de6b9a85f8fd80823
sha256_hash: 1c9d20896f1c44c2dbbb6bb05979c1ec374d097b9af4d881c0c1949ddc1d821f
sha256_hash: c1c2fd46ce19afa66360c6db20edba84c460b254dc4676949bf38bdd41cdd577
sha256_hash: cf4adca8773145cf0a1d4ba32d555643442e14e9181ae8450bfb79ab86144914
sha256_hash: 245dd0bfff1c08559e5e68ea25aadb5bcb6ebef5831ec19c34d8d2021747157fe
```

[Figure 25]

Therefore, we can pick up one of these hashes, download the respective sample from **Malware Bazaar**, unzip it (password: **infected**) and load it into **PE Bear** (**Figures 26** and **27**):

```
remnux@remnux:~/malware/mas$ malwoverview.py -b 5 -B ede4c71a7d7a09d4da1860cbfec4a0a02104b510eb359883e3276a018f39ead8 -o 0
```

#### MALWARE BAZAAR REPORT

SAMPLE SAVED!

```
remnux@remnux:~/malware/mas$ 7z e ede4c71a7d7a09d4da1860cbfec4a0a02104b510eb359883e3276a018f39ead8.zip
```

7-Zip [64] 16.02 : Copyright (c) 1999-2016 Igor Pavlov : 2016-05-21  
p7zip Version 16.02 (locale=en\_US.UTF-8,Utf16=on,HugeFiles=on,64 bits,2 CPUs Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-1087  
5H CPU @ 2.30GHz (A0652),ASM,AES-NI)

Scanning the drive for archives:  
1 file, 210062 bytes (206 KiB)


Extracting archive: ede4c71a7d7a09d4da1860cbfec4a0a02104b510eb359883e3276a018f39ead8.zip

--  
Path = ede4c71a7d7a09d4da1860cbfec4a0a02104b510eb359883e3276a018f39ead8.zip  
Type = zip  
Physical Size = 210062

Enter password (will not be echoed):  
Everything is Ok


Size: 388608  
Compressed: 210062

[Figure 26]



[Figure 27]

After unpacking this sample using the same method and breakpoints (on **x32dbg**) as shown previously, we should verify it on **PE Bear** as shown below:



[Figure 28]

Using our C2 data decryptor script against this second unpacked Hancitor we have:

```
C:\Users\Administrador\Desktop\MAS>hancitor_conf_extractor.py
Filename: unpacked_hancitor_2.bin
```

The decrypted configuration follows:

```
0710_pkrdv      http://strictence.com/8/forum.php|http://wimberels.ru/8/forum.php|http://cithernista.ru/8/forum.php|
```

[Figure 29]

As we expected, everything has worked well again and we have a good Hancitor script to extract and decrypt its C2 configuration data.


There're two other methods that could have used **to extract the C2 data configuration from Hancitor**:

- **Cyber Chef:** <https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/>
- Through a debugger (**x32dbg**)

Both approaches are great, but they are understood as “manual” methods and we would need to work on one sample a time. Using a debugger is quite simple because it's enough **to set a breakpoint on CryptDecrypt( )** and, **once hit, execute until its exit point and check (Follow in Dump) its output parameter (the 5<sup>th</sup> argument) on stack**. Certainly, the reader knows how to perform these steps.




To use CyberChef, we need to select the bytes of the key and export it using **SHIFT+E (Edit → Export Data)** and copy this data into the **Input** area. Pick up **From Hex** recipe (because exported data are in hexadecimal format) then the **SHA1** recipe because we want a **SHA1 hash** from the **Input**, as shown in the Figure 30:



[Figure 30]

To the encrypted data (gathered from **0x10004018**), repeat the same procedure by exporting it (**SHIFT+E**) and copying it into the **Input** area. Drag **RC4** recipe into **Recipe** area and pay attention to few points: a.) the passphrase is composed by the **first 10 hexadecimal digits (5 bytes)** from **SHA1 output** (as we learned from **CryptDeriveKey()**); b.) the **Passphrase is in hex format**; c.) the **Input format** is also in hexadecimal format. Finally, we got the same result of our Python 3 script as shown in the Figure 31 below:



[Figure 31]

## 11. Conclusion

In this first article I showed how to extract and decrypt the C2 data configuration from Hancitor malware by writing a Python 3 script. Additionally, I presented several concepts and foundations such as code injection and unpacking that will be useful in next articles of this series. Anyway, maybe it's quite relevant to highlight few points here:

- a. I preferred this simple malware sample due my final purpose that's to help other professionals to take their own steps on malware analysis and, to start a series of article, certainly it was quite useful.
- b. For now, I have hidden a lot reversing engineering details about this malware on propose because the initial goal was focusing only on C2 data configuration extraction and decryption in this article.
- c. Once again, and unlike what many beginners in reverse engineering might think about, data extraction/decryption is not something new (not even close), and I've been doing it from many years, so it's a great topic to start with. Furthermore, getting C2 configuration is one of the main goals while analyzing a malware ( few other ones are infection's vector, persistence, evasion and network communication, for example).
- d. I chose Python 3 as script language because I think it's easier to understand and most of security researchers know well about it. No doubts, we could write programs in C or Golang and, eventually we can use them in next articles.
- e. We will study several samples and contexts in the next articles and review topics such as **COM, unpacking, code injection, C2 emulation, .NET reversing, anti-analysis techniques, API resolving, string decryption, IDC/IDA Python, IDA AppCall** and so on, so let's take it one step at a time.

**Don't forget:** this is a live document and I will update it soon I find mistakes and errors.

I have been working with reverse engineering for over a decade, I'd like having started this series previously, but it wasn't possible, unfortunately. Therefore, now my plan is to write a book about malware analysis to contribute to the security community and continue this series. Let's see what will happen.

Just in case you want to keep in touch, my public contact information follows below:

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- **LinkedIn:** <https://www.linkedin.com/in/aleborges>
- **Blog:** <https://exploitreversing.com>

Keep reversing and I see you at next time!

**Alexandre Borges**